In this paper we examine composability properties for the fundamental task of key exchange. Roughly speaking, we show that key exchange protocols secure in the prevalent model of Bellare and Rogaway can be composed with arbitrary protocols that require symmetrically distributed keys. This composition theorem holds if the key exchange protocol satisfies an additional technical requirement that our analysis brings to light: it should be possible to determine which sessions derive equal keys given only the publicly available information.
1. INTRODUCTION
Background
Typical security proofs of modern-day cryptography involve sophisticated reductions based on probabilistic arguments that are error prone and often difficult to verify. One of the few available approaches to make the analysis of complex systems even remotely possible is compositional design and analysis. Here, one concludes the security of a larger system from the security of individual components via general composition principles. This paper is a contribution to this line of research. Our work is focused on the composability of one of the most fundamental cryptographic tasks, secure key exchange.
There are two main approaches to capture security of protocols. One is based on the simulation paradigm such as the universal composition (UC) framework and related models [7, 2, 15] . The other approach uses games to model security. Simulation-based security offers structured, intuitively appealing means for defining security, and often allow to conclude security of composed protocols automatically. At the same time, the resulting frameworks can be complex and involve hard to grasp subtleties. Additionally, the strong security requirements imposed by simulation prevent efficient secure realisations for many important tasks. Furthermore, and in some sense this is the main motivation for the present work, simulation frameworks (e.g. [9] ) are often simply not suitable for the analysis of existing protocols of practical importance, mainly because such protocols do not meet the highly stringent requirements that simulationbased security demands. The only remaining alternative is to then use game-based formalisms (e.g. [5, 6, 3, 8, 17] ). Their requirements are less onerous, yet the level of security for the keys that are derived is usually quite high: they are indistinguishable from random keys. Unfortunately, while we have a good understanding of the level of security that standard game-based models entail for key-exchange protocols when these are executed stand-alone, there are no rigorously demonstrated -or even defined!-guarantees for their composition with other tasks. Our work fills this gap.
In this paper we study composability of key exchange protocols with arbitrary tasks that use symmetric keys. A typical application example is the use of a key exchange protocol to establish symmetric keys used later in a secure channel protocol. The security definitions that we consider, for both stand alone and composed protocol are within the traditional game-based setting. Our main result is a theorem that allows composition of key exchange with arbitrary pro-tocols that use symmetrically shared keys. Perhaps surprisingly, the main requirement on the key exchange is a mild refinement of the original security definition by Bellare and Rogaway [4] (BR model). We note that one can, for instance, easily incorporate the eCK derivative [17] of the BR model into our framework by adapting the corresponding stronger corruption type accordingly. An additional requirement for our composition result is a technical condition on matching sessions which we show to be (in a formal sense) necessary.
Summary of results
Abstract framework for games. We first develop a framework for specifying cryptographic games (for two-party protocols). Our formalization reflects standard definitional ideas in cryptography that originate in the work of Bellare and Rogaway [4] . Here, an adversary controls all communication between the participating parties and interacts with the algorithms that define the protocol, through an interface offered by the cryptographic game. The goal of the adversary is to trigger a specific event that the game considers "bad". We model this goal as a predicate on the complete state of the execution. This abstract way of defining security is sufficiently flexible to generalize most, if not all, existing game-based security definitions. Our abstract model for games should be of independent interest. Security of key exchange protocols. Interestingly, the crucial security notion we demand from the key exchange protocol is based on the original proposal of Bellare and Rogaway [4] , as refined by Blake-Wilson et al. [6] for the publickey setting. Recall, their model ensures that an adversary cannot distinguish keys derived via the protocol from random strings (selected from the key space). Additionally, they identify the two local "partner" sessions involved in an execution of the protocol via the concept of matching conversations. They demand that at most two sessions can have the same matching conversation. As a stepping stone towards our result we show how to cast the BR security definition in our abstract framework. Our formulation maintains the key-indistinguishability requirement. However, we pair local sessions via the more general concept of session identifiers as introduced by Bellare, Pointcheval and Rogaway [3] . These identifiers are generated on the fly during protocol execution and match more closely how real world protocols define their partners. For example the TLS [13] and SSH protocols [19] both have session identifiers set during the course of execution. We demand that at most two local sessions agree on the same (global) session identifier.
Public session matching. In the above definition we match sessions via session identifiers that are locally computed on the fly. Thus, they may be unknown to third parties, in particular to the adversary. However, we were only able to prove general composability for key exchange protocols which satisfy an additional technical requirement, namely the existence of a public session matching algorithm. Roughly, such an algorithm is able to determine which sessions have derived equal session identifiers, only using public information. Note this is not as restrictive as it may seem: protocols where sessions are defined via matching conversations [4] fall into this class. Therefore, session matching is more of a functional requirement than a security requirement.
Defining composition. We compose key exchange protocols with arbitrary two-party symmetric key protocols, i.e., protocols, whose execution relies on a shared secret key.
Given a game G ke defining the security of the key exchange protocol, ke, and given the game Gπ defining the security of the symmetric key protocol, π, we generically define the execution of the composed protocol, and a game G ke;π , capturing its security. In the composed protocol, each session first runs an instance of the key exchange protocol and then uses the derived key to execute the symmetric key protocol while not using any other information from the key exchange stage. The game G ke;π allows the adversary to interact with ke and π simultaneously: at any given point some sessions may be in the key exchange stage, while others are in the symmetric key protocol stage. The security requirement on the composition is inherited from Gπ: the adversary wins against the composition if it breaks the symmetric key protocol. The game G ke;π does not place any explicit security requirement on the key exchange protocol.
Composition theorem. Our main result is that BR-secure key exchange protocols, for which a session matching algorithm exists, can be securely composed with arbitrary symmetric key protocols. In practice, assume you want to run a key exchange protocol to use the keys for a secure channel. To conclude security of the entire protocol, one would usually analyse the protocol as a whole. Instead, with our theorem, one can now analyse the two components seperately, and more importantly, if one uses an existing provable secure key exchange protocol (i.e. BR-secure), one can simply re-use the existing security analysis without further investigation; and the same applies to secure channels.
We notice that secure channel protocols usually fall into the class of so-called single session reducible protocols, a notion we introduce in this paper. For protocols in this class, it suffices to analyse a single session of the protocol and security for concurrent execution follows automatically.
Overall, in the case of a composed protocol consisting of a key exchange part and a secure channel part, the analysis boils down to a single session analysis of the secure channel protocol and a (possibly existing) BR-analysis of the key exchange part. For clarity, we emphasise that single session reducibility is not a requirement of our framework, but a useful tool to shorten a complex analysis if applicable.
We now take a closer look at the public session matching we assume to exist: one might think that this requirement is a necessary artifact for our proof to work. However, this is (provably) not the case. In the full version, we show that if a key exchange protocol is composable with arbitrary symmetric key protocols and security is shown via a specific kind of black-box reduction, then (a weak form of) a session matching algorithm exists. We emphasize that the public session matching is only on the key exchange protocol, and not on the subsequent uses of the key; hence, it does not impact the protocol with which the key exchange is composed.
We finally note that it may look impossible to provide secure composition of key exchange protocols with arbitrary symmetric key protocols. The seemingly intuitive counter argument is that, if the symmetric key protocol "misbehaves" in the sense that it duplicates some steps of the key exchange protocol in a bad way, then the composition would easily become insecure. As an example assume that the key exchange somehow involves (in a secure way) a step in which a nonce is encrypted under the new session key, and that the first step of the subsequent protocol is that a party, exceptionally receiving such an encrypted message, would immediately disclose the session key. Then replaying the previous message from the key exchange phase should violate the security of the overall protocol. This line of reasoning, however, is incorrect. Key indistinguishability of a key exchange protocol essentially says that one can replace the actual key by an independent random key, more or less decoupling the two phases. This is even true in presence of key leakage in the symmetric key protocol, as such leakage can be already captured in the Bellare-Rogaway model through special key reveals the adversary can enforce. This implies that the "misbehaving" symmetric key protocol either contradicts the indistinguishability of the key exchange protocol, or that the duplication of steps is harmless because the derived key is independent of the information flow in the key exchange phase. Carrying out this argument formally requires some care, especially with the session matching, but our theorem shows that general composition indeed holds.
Related work
The work of Canetti and Krawczyk on session-key (SK) security [8, 9] is probably closest in spirit and motivation with ours. They spell out why game based techniques may sometime be preferable to simulation based ones. Their formalization of SK security uses game-based techniques (explicitly avoiding the simulation paradigm) and provides a limited form of composition: SK-secure protocols can be composed with secure channels. Notice that this result is specific to secure channels and does not apply to other tasks.
In follow-up work Canetti and Krawczyk obtain more general composability properties for the SK-security notion [9] . The approach is however not direct: they show that protocols that satisfy a variant of SK-security implement, in a UC sense an ideal functionality for key exchange. They therefore conclude that SK-security is composable. The crucial difference between this composition result and ours is the composability properties that SK-security enjoys are still obtained (indirectly) via a simulation-based framework (and thus inherit the associated problems). Furthermore, the equivalence with UC key exchange functionality is imperfect. One either requires that protocols conform to a particular form (requirement not met by practical protocols), or equivalence is proven with respect to a weaker version of UC.
Shoup presents a security framework for key exchange which resembles the BR model, even though it is cast as a simulation-based approach [18] . Shoup takes into account protocol interference of the subsequent symmetric key protocol with the key exchange protocol. That is, his notion of a secure key exchange protocol requires key indistinguishability in presence of arbitrary applications using the keys. Still, his model does not allow to reason about the security of the composed protocol, i.e., when the symmetric key protocol uses keys derived from the key exchange protocol.
The work of Datta et al. [11] is also aimed at compositional analysis of protocols. They use the logical framework called Protocol Compositional Logic [12] . One can regard this line of research as an effort to add some structure to a gamebased formalism. In this case, the structure is in the form of an additional layer of logical formalism: formulas in the logic express security properties specified in a game-based framework. By working directly within the game-based framework we present a more general framework where the language for specifying protocols is left unspecified. We therefore impose no restrictions on the primitives used in the construction of our protocols. In contrast, adding new primitives to the formalism of [11] would require re-proving the validity of many of the axioms and inference rules from scratch.
Recent works get around some of the technical issues that make the UC framework non-applicable to practical protocols. For example Küsters and Tuengerthal [16] eliminated the need for pre-establish session identifiers. However, some of the other problems (e.g., the limitation to static corruption) still seems to present an insurmountable obstacle.
PROTOCOLS
Games are a standard modelling approach for security of schemes. In such a game, an arbitrary adversary interacts with the algorithms that define the protocol, via a set of queries that capture the use of the protocol in a real system. The adversary sends queries to the game, which computes responses using the algorithms under attack. The adversary tries to trigger an event which the game deems bad.
In this section we first give a general abstract definition for cryptographic games and then specialise it in two ways. First we explain how key exchange is an instance of our abstract framework. Then we identify a class of protocols, which we call "symmetric key protocols".
Identities.
We fix an integer ni of size polynomial in the security parameter. Identities, used to model the users of a system, are identified by some integer i, with 0 ≤ i < ni.
Protocols.
A protocol is a pair of algorithms (kg, ξ), where kg is a randomized key generation algorithm taking as input the security parameter and outputting keys from some key space. The algorithm ξ is the algorithm executed locally by a party that executes the protocol.
Local sessions of a protocol are identified by local session identifiers lsid ∈ Z × Z × Z, where the local identifier lsid = (i, j, k) refers to the k-th local session of the identity i, where the intended partner identity is j. These identifiers are only for bookkeeping. They allow the adversary to uniquely identify each session within the game and are not used by the protocol.
Games. Formally, a game is a probabilistic Turing machine with an input tape to receive queries from the adversary, an output tape to return responses to the adversary, a random tape and internal state. The internal state consists of the following:
-LSID: The set of all local session identifiers valid for use within the game. This set is assumed to be hardwired in the model.
* : This function provides session state information for a given session lsid ∈ LSID. Session state information is specific to the type of protocol being executed and usually denotes user-specific data.
-LST : LSID → {0, 1} * : The local session state is the state for a specific session containing the game-relevant variables for this session.
-EST ∈ {0, 1} * : The game execution state stores information needed for the execution model which is not used on a session-by-session basis. For example this may contain long term keys of identities.
-MST ∈ {0, 1} * : The model state for the security requirement being modeled provides information to the game which is not session specific. For example this may be some bit which the adversary is attempting to discover.
Many previous models for protocols do not separate the session state and local session state. We do this to provide a clear boundary between variables used and updated by the protocol's algorithm and those used by the game to model various security requirements. For example, the session state may contain the session key computed by running a key exchange algorithm, while the local session state would consist of flags to mark individual sessions as corrupted or revealed. Naturally, this local session information shall neither be used by, nor be available to the algorithm that defines the behaviour of a session. Note, although we require the internal state to consist of these components, one may still model any arbitrary game via these requirements: if any arbitrary variable is used directly by the protocol it is stored in either SST or EST, otherwise it is stored in LST or MST. For example, if the game's security requirement required a history of all queries made, this would be stored in MST.
Consequently we use two setup algorithms for initialising these two separate sets of state within the game. The first initialises the state specific to the execution model of the protocol, while the second initialises the state used for the security requirement being modelled.
-(SST, EST) ← setupE(LSID, kg, 1 η ): Initialises the session state and game execution state, where kg is the protocol's key generation algorithm and 1 η is the security parameter.
-(LST, MST) ← setupG(LSID, SST, EST, 1 η ): Initialises the local session state and model state.
An adversary is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm that interacts with a game through a finite number of well defined queries in a set Q. The game processes each query in a given way, i.e., according to its behaviour, the algorithm χ, which runs on the internal game state and the query provided; a response is then passed back to the adversary. The game behaviour χ makes calls to underlying protocol algorithms, i.e. for a query to a left-or-right oracle in a typical encryption game, χ computes the appropriate response with the help of the underlying encryption algorithm.
As usual, not all queries are valid at all points within a game's execution. We model this possibility via a predicate, Valid, which the game tests each time it receives a query. The Valid predicate takes as input the entire game state and the query received; either true or false is returned, indicating whether the game processes or ignores the query. It is required that all Valid predicates check that any local session identifiers are in the set LSID, and if a query has no specified Valid predicate we assume this is the only check made. Throughout the paper we give only informal descriptions for all Valid predicates. However the formal descriptions are available in the full version of this paper.
When the game receives a query q ∈ Q it executes in the following way:
If Valid(q, (LSID, SST, LST, EST, MST)) returns false then do nothing and return invalid to the adversary. The set of queries, Q, always includes a Send query, taking as input lsid ∈ LSID and message msg ∈ {0, 1} * . Typically for a Send query, the behaviour χ executes the algorithm ξ on the local session state of session lsid and message msg. This algorithm then returns an updated session state and a response to be passed back to the adversary. Formally this is defined as follows; note for brevity we omit the full notation of χ taking as input the game's state, and assume this implicitly.
The Send query is used to allow the adversary to simulate messages being sent over a network. It receives back a response which is computed by running the protocol algorithm. This gives the adversary complete control over the network so it can alter, delay, create or delete messages.
The goal of the adversary is to trigger some event which is deemed "bad", i.e. the adversary has in some sense broken the security of the protocol. In order to test for such an event there exists a predicate P associated to the game G which is an algorithm of the form b ← P(LSID, SST, LST, EST, MST), where b ∈ {0, 1}, and b = 1 if and only if the adversary has succeeded in its goal.
The entire process of the adversary interacting with the game, through to the predicate being applied, is called the experiment, which is executed in the following way.
-The game runs (SST, EST) ← setupE(LSID, kg, 1 η ) and (LST, MST) ← setupG(LSID, SST, EST, 1 η ).
-The adversary now proceeds to send queries from the set Q to the game. Note that the game may pass some information of the initialisation phase to the adversary, like the users' public keys, by introducing a special query to Q which can be made only once, at the beginning.
We write Exp G π,A (1 η ) for the experiment where A is the adversary, π is the protocol and G is the game. We write Exp G π,A (1 η ) = b for the event that the predicate P associated to G outputs bit b. Note that our notion of protocols and games is general enough to subsume distinct protocols and their games under a single one, with the parties using some identifier to address different sub protocols, and usually demanding that the adversary only needs to win some of the games to break the composed game. This is particularly interesting for our composition theorem, because it immediately allows one to conclude security even if pairs of parties subsequently run different protocols.
KEY EXCHANGE PROTOCOLS
A key exchange protocol allows two local sessions, which use long term keys of identities, to agree upon a short term session key. We consider identities who have asymmetric long term keys. (The case of symmetric long term keys can be done analogously.) In order to "partner" two sessions we use the notion of a session identifier value. This value is computed by the key exchange protocol. Using a session identifier still allows one to base partnering on notions such as matching conversation as done by Bellare et al. [4] ; us-ing the message transcript one can achieve a similar, while not equivalent notion. Partnered sessions are required to compute the same session key, and this session key must be indistinguishable from random. Further, as we consider two party protocols at most two sessions should ever share the same session identifier.
The session identifier is distinct to the local session identifier lsid. The former is computed by the key exchange algorithm to determine which sessions are partners, whilst the latter is simply a unique label for the adversary to address queries to a particular session.
We assume that when a key exchange protocol session agrees upon or rejects a key, the adversary knows this has taken place. We require this property explicitly, but one can see that in the models of [4, 6] , by sending a 'Reveal' query after every 'Send' query it is possible for an adversary to learn when sessions accept or reject a key.
To model the above requirements of a key exchange protocol we introduce two security games. The first requirement, secrecy, is modelled using the methods of Bellare-Rogaway security: the adversary chooses a session of the game and receives either a random key or the real session key agreed. It wins the game if it determines correctly with which it was provided. We model only protocols that provide forward security, i.e. if a long term key is corrupted by an adversary, any session keys (including those computed using the corrupted long term key) already agreed will still be considered secure.
1 The second security game places restrictions on the partnered sessions: The adversary attempts to cause partnered sessions to agree upon different keys, or force at least three sessions to agree upon the same session identifier.
Both security games have the same execution model, and share many of the same characteristics in terms of game state. Therefore we first introduce the common elements and introduce game-specific properties later. In particular, both games share Send, Corrupt and Reveal queries. The two games have different winning conditions, and the BRsecrecy game allows the adversary the additional Test and Guess queries.
Game execution state. The execution state for key exchange games consists of a list L keys with tuples (i, pki, ski, δi), where i is some identity, pki ∈ {0, 1} * is the public key of the identity i, ski ∈ {0, 1} * is the secret key of i and δi ∈ {honest, corrupted} denotes whether i has been corrupted by the adversary or not. This model assumes there is some secure PKI to distribute keys to identities.
Session state. For key exchange protocols the session state for the local session identified by lsid = (i, j, k) consists of the following:
* × {0, 1} * : This is the long term key pair for the identity i to whom this session belongs.
-pkj ∈ {0, 1} * : This is the public key, for the identity j, who is the intended partner of this session.
-sid ∈ {0, 1} * ∪ {⊥}: This is the session identifier for the session. We say that two sessions are partners if they share the same session identifier and sid =⊥. Once sid is set to a value different from ⊥, it may not be changed. 1 Note that the corruption model is essentially a parameter of our model. One can equally define non-forward secure protocols where the adversary receives the state of parties, or forward-secure protocols where the adversary is allowed to communicate with sessions after corrupting them. If modelled correctly, consistency of the composed game is preserved, and our overall composition result should still holds.
The setup algorithm for the execution model of key exchange algorithms.
-κ ∈ {0, 1} * ∪{⊥}: This is the session key for the protocol, where ⊥ indicates no session key has yet been agreed. -γ ∈ {running, accepted, rejected}: This provides the current execution state of the protocol, indicating the session's acceptance (or rejection) of a session key. It is required if κ =⊥ then γ = accepted and if γ = accepted then sid =⊥. Furthermore if γ = running then execution for this session has "finished", therefore no further updates to the session state are allowed. -sinfo ∈ {0, 1} * ∪ {⊥}: This is any additional session state required for specific key exchange protocols.
Note, these requirements mean, in the final step of a key exchange protocol (in response to a Send query), the value κ is set to some value and γ is set to accepted before a response is returned to the adversary.
We write SST(lsid) = ((pki, ski), pkj, sid, κ, γ, sinfo) for the session state of the session identified by lsid. For clarity we provide notation for accessing individual elements of the session state. For example we write SST(lsid).κ for the session key κ of local session lsid. Individual elements of a game's state are also updated via similar notation.
Local session state. The local session state for key exchange protocols is composed of: -δ ∈ {honest, corrupted}: Details whether the identity associated to this session was corrupted before the session was completed (i.e. while γ = running). -δpnr ∈ {honest, corrupted}: Details whether the identity of the partner associated to this session was corrupted before the session was completed. -ω ∈ {fresh, revealed}: Shows if the session key for this session has been revealed to the adversary.
Although we keep track of the value δi for each identity within the execution state, keeping track of δ for each session allows sessions that have completed before an identity is corrupted, to continue being thought of as not corrupt. In turn, this is used to model forward secrecy 2 . We write LST(lsid) = (δ, δpnr, ω) for the local session state of the session lsid.
Setup. To initialise the games for key exchange protocols the setupE algorithm is used to generate all asymmetric keys for identities. Each session is then initialised with the correct asymmetric keys, while all other variables are initially set to be undefined. This is shown in Figure 1 .
Queries. For the Send query in key exchange protocol games, we require that the algorithm ξ ke outputs a response = 2 In forward secure protocols, sessions that accepted a key before the corresponding user gets corrupted are still considered honest after the corruption occurs. When modelling non-forward secure protocols all sessions of a user are considered corrupted when the adversary makes a corruption query for this user.
Corrupt(i):
LST ← LST For (i, pki, ski, δi) ∈ Lkeys do δi ← corrupted For all lsid ∈ LSID s.t. lsid = (i, * , * ) do //set all running executions of party i to corrupted If SST(lsid).γ = running then LST (lsid).δ ← corrupted For all lsid ∈ LSID s.t. lsid = ( * , i, * ) do //set pointer to i in all running partner executions to corrupted If SST(lsid).γ = running then set LST (lsid).δpnr ← corrupted Return ((SST, LST , EST, MST), ski) Reveal(lsid):
LST ← LST and LST (lsid).ω ← revealed Return ((SST, LST , EST, MST), SST(lsid).κ) Figure 2 : The queries for key exchange protocols.
(γ, msg ). This explicitly tells the adversary when a session accepts or rejects a key. Additionally to the Send query, the adversary may make Corrupt and Reveal queries, formally given in Figure 2 . The Corrupt query allows the adversary to take control of all sessions of an identity by receiving its long term secret key. This query marks the identity as corrupt and all sessions of this identity which have not completed are also marked as corrupt. As completed sessions are not set to be corrupt we only consider key exchange protocols which provide forward security. The Reveal query returns the derived session key to the adversary and marks the session as revealed. Using a Valid predicate, we restrict adversaries to only make Send queries to un-revealed sessions of non-corrupt users where the key has not been accepted or rejected.
BR-secrecy game. To provide secrecy guarantees of the session key we ask an adversary to decide whether it received the real session key, or a random value, for a session of its choice. It is assumed any random value is drawn from some key distribution D (often the uniform distribution for bit strings of length |κ|). We write κ $ ← − D for the value of κ drawn randomly from the distribution D. We call this game the BR-secrecy game and use the execution model of key exchange protocols as described so far. We now set out the additional details of the model for the secrecy property.
The model state for the BR-secrecy game contains two bits, btest ∈ {0, 1} and bguess ∈ {0, 1, ⊥} along with a session identifier lsid tested ∈ LSID ∪ {⊥}. We write MST = (btest, bguess, lsid tested ) for the model state in the BR-secrecy game. The bit btest determines whether the adversary is given the real session key, or random value in response to the Test query. 3 The bit bguess stores the adversary's guess for the value of btest. The session identifier lsid tested is the local session identifier for which the Test query was made.
The algorithm setupG initialises the model state by selecting the random value for btest. Upon initialisation bguess and lsid tested are undefined, so set to ⊥. This is shown in Figure 3 .
There are two additional queries required to model the BR-security of a key exchange protocol, namely Test and Guess. The Test query provides the adversary with either the real session key for a given session, or a random value. The Guess query provides the game with the adversary's guess to the value btest. The queries are given in Figure 3 .
In order to prevent trivial attacks, we place restrictions 3 We assume that the adversary only makes a single Test query. Security with respect to many Test queries then follows by a hybrid argument [4] . on the admissibility of the Test query. An adversary is not allowed to Test a session which is corrupt, has not accepted, or whose partner is corrupt, or to test more than a session. In these cases, the Valid predicate for the Test query returns false. Note that these cases are publicly verifiable. The Valid predicate checks if a session (or partner session) is corrupt by checking the value of δ or δpnr stored in the local session state, LST. Moreover, the adversary should not Test a session which is revealed or where the partner session has been revealed. In these cases though, the Valid predicate does not return false but instead lets the adversary continue. This is in order to prevent leakage of partnering information through the Test query. The adversary may not be aware this has occurred; however at the end of execution the predicate checks for this, and causes the experiment to be lost if such an action has occurred. We also forbid Reveal queries on the tested session or its partner. Again, the adversary is later declared to lose if such a Reveal query happens (but again without being informed immediately). Furthermore we only allow the adversary one Guess query.
The predicate for the BR-secrecy game checks if the adversary's guess for the value of btest is correct. Furthermore, the predicate causes the adversary to lose the game if the tested session (or its partner) have been revealed. No checks relating to corruption are required, as we only consider protocols which are forward secure; hence if an identity is corrupted after the Test query is made, key indistinguishability should still hold. The predicate P BR is defined in Figure 4 .
We write the BR-secrecy game as G BR,D , where D is the key distribution from which random keys are chosen during the Test query. Furthermore we denote the game G BR,D with the secret bit btest as G btest BR,D .
Definition 2. We define the advantage of the adversary A against the BR-secrecy property as
where ke is the key exchange protocol analysed.
Partnering security game. In the partnering security
Psid(LSID, SST, LST, EST, MST):
For each lsid = (i, j, k) ∈ LSID do If SST(lsid).sid =⊥ then for all triples (j , i , k ) ∈ LSID with SST((j , i , k )).sid = SST(lsid).sid do If (j , i ) / ∈ {(i, j), (j, i)} then return 1.
//distinct intended partners
If i = i , j = j , LST(i, j, k).δ = LST(j , i , k ).δ = accepted but SST(i , j , k ).κ = SST(lsid).κ then return 1. //distinct keys If the number of triples (j , i , k ) ∈ LSID with SST( (j , i , k ) ).sid = SST(lsid).sid is strictly larger than 2, then return 1. //Too many partners Return 0. game the adversary attempts to cause the session identifiers within the game to be considered invalid in some way. This is done by causing more than two sessions to share the same session identifier, making a session accept a key without setting the session identifier, or causing two sessions to hold the same session identifier, but where the intended partner identity of such sessions are incorrect. Moreover, the adversary wins if two sessions have the same session identifier and different keys. All these properties are modelled via the winning condition of the partnering which is defined through P sid , see Figure 5 .
The partnering security game requires no model state or additional queries to those required for general execution of a key exchange protocol. The setupG algorithm sets the LST function and leaves the model state undefined. We give the formal description in Figure 6 .
The partnering security game is written as G sid , and the advantage of the adversary A against the partnering security property as
Definition 3 (BR-secure protocol). We call a key exchange protocol ke BR-secure w.r.t. D if for all adversaries A, Adv Session Matching. For composability, we need an additional property, called session matching. Roughly, this means that an eavesdropper on the communication between the BR-adversary and the BR-secrecy game should be able to deduce which sessions are partnered, i.e. at any time, the eavesdropper should be able to produce a list of pairs of all partnered (accepted) sessions. Note that this is trivially satisfied when defining session identifiers through matching conversations. However, when using abstract session identifiers, sid, this need not be the case. For instance, consider a BR-secure key exchange that uses matching conversations as the session identifier. We now transform the protocol as follows: The participants encrypt all messages they send. The session identifiers are now defined as matching conversa- tions on the plaintexts. First note that the resulting key exchange protocol is as secure as the original, assuming secure encryption. But the protocol has an interesting property: Assume the encryption scheme is re-randomizable. Then, an eavesdropper on the communication is unable to deduce which sessions between two parties are partnered, as the BR-adversary may re-randomize all messages sent.
We therefore define an efficient session matching algorithm M which can deduce from the communication between the BR-secrecy adversary and BR-secrecy game which sessions are partnered. Algorithm M is allowed to see all queries and answers exchanged between a key exchange and an adversary A; this includes all public parameters of the system. The requirement on M is independent of the winning condition of A in the game; algorithm M needs to provide correct matchings constantly. More formally, a session matching algorithm M for the key exchange protocol is defined as an efficient algorithm that receives all information exchanged between a key exchange game G BR and an adversary A against G BR . We require that each time the key exchange game sends a response to the adversary A, algorithm M is able to output two sets LSIDpartner and LSID single , where LSIDpartner contains pairs (lsid0, lsid1), and LSID single consists of session identifiers lsid. We define the predicate Ppartner to specify correctness of these sets by checking all pairs (lsid0, lsid1) are sessions which share the same session identifier, and all identifiers in the set LSID single are sessions which are currently unpartnered. This is formally described in Figure 7 .
Definition 4 (Session matching algorithm).
A session matching algorithm M : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} * for a key exchange protocol ke is an efficient algorithm such that the following holds for any adversary A playing against G BR : After each response of the key exchange game, the algorithm M is given an ordered list of all queries and responses made between A and G BR,D , along with the public parameters of the system. Algorithm M then outputs sets LSIDpartner and LSID single such that, for the current state (LSID, SST, LST, EST, MST) of the game, the sets LSIDpartner, LSID single always satisfy the predicate Ppartner(LSID, SST, LST, EST, MST, LSIDpartner, LSID single ).
We remark that the idea of a session matching algorithm has already appeared in different forms in the literature. As mentioned above, in the original paper [4] the notion of matching conversations via the communication transcripts (and their order) supports a straightforward session matching algorithm. In [5] Bellare and Rogaway introduce a partner function which resembles our notion of a session matching algorithm, but their function does not need to be efficiently computable. Finally, in [3] the authors require the session identifiers, defining essentially the partners, to be given to the adversary upon acceptance of a session, again yielding a session matching algorithm straightforwardly. As we show in the full version, a weak form of session matching algorithm is in fact necessary to ensure secure composition.
SYMMETRIC-KEY PROTOCOLS
We now introduce the class of symmetric key protocols. They use a symmetric session key which is shared between pairs of sessions, i.e. these are the protocols that run after a key agreement protocol has completed. Games for symmetric key protocols allow the adversary to initialise sessions, causing the game to generate a new session key. The adversary can partner two sessions, so that they share the same key. Finally the adversary may choose session keys, and initialise sessions with its chosen key. The latter forces any model to cope with sessions where the key is known to the adversary. For example an adversary should not be considered to have broken the security requirement if it does so against a session for which it has chosen the key. Potentially, the adversary has access to additional queries which depend on the precise requirements of the protocol being modeled.
As for all protocols a symmetric key protocol π = (kg, ξ) consists of a randomized key generation algorithm and protocol algorithm. We write D kg as the distribution of keys output from the key generation algorithm. The key generation algorithm of π is used to generate the session keys.
We consider arbitrary protocols π and so the security requirements depend on the protocol being analysed. We now provide the minimum requirements of games for symmetric key protocols.
Game execution state. The game execution state EST is not required for the execution of a symmetric key protocol and so is assumed to be undefined for the duration of execution.
Session state. The session state for symmetric key protocols consists of two variables: κ ∈ {0, 1} * ∪ {⊥}: This is the symmetric session key for the protocol. sinfo ∈ {0, 1} * ∪ {⊥}: This is any additional session state required for specific symmetric key protocols.
Local session state. The local session state for symmetric key protocols consists of two variables.
ψ ∈ {secret, known}: This denotes whether a key is "known" by the adversary. lst ∈ {0, 1} * ∪ {⊥}: This contains any other local session state required to model the security required of a symmetric key protocol.
Setup. The setupE algorithm to initialise the session states simply sets all initial values to be undefined, running as given in Figure 8 . The setupG algorithm is required to initialise the model state and local session state. The value of ψ in the local session state must be set to secret initially. However as other details of model state and local session state are unknown due to the generic nature of our model, we do not specify the setupG algorithm here.
Queries. There are a minimum of four queries available to the adversary in symmetric protocol games. The Send query is available and behaves as described previously. There are three queries to allow the adversary to initialise sessions. The first, InitS, causes the game to generate a new session key using the key generation algorithm. The second, InitP, partners two sessions by keying the second session with the key of the first one. The third, InitK, allows the adversary to choose a key, which is then used as the session key. This final method of initialisation sets the value of ψ for the current session to known.
These different initialisation methods correspond to what can happen in situations where protocols are composed with key exchange: Sometimes, keys known to the adversary are used in the protocol, so that this needs to be reflected in the syntax. Also, initialisation of two parties never happens simultaneously as parties accept keys one after the other. Now, formally the initialisation queries are given in Figure 8 . Additionally to the output okay, the game is allowed to output further information.
Sanity checks are required for the Send, InitS, InitP and InitK queries. The Valid condition for Send checks the session key κ has been initialised to some value and can be used. This is the minimum check required and may be augmented for specific games. The checks for initialisation queries ensure that one cannot change the keys for sessions already initialised with a session key. Also when performing the InitP query a check is made that the first session already has a session key.
Predicate. The predicate for the symmetric key protocol game depends on the security model required for the protocol π. However we note it may be necessary for the predicate to take into account the value of ψ in the local session state.
We typically denote the game of the protocol π as Gπ. The advantage of an adversary against a symmetric key protocol may depend on some constant ∆ (typically 0 for computational games or 1/2 for decisional games) and we define the advantage by
We say that the protocol π is secure with respect to Gπ if the advantage Adv We remark that, at a superficial glance, the session matching algorithm for the key exchange protocol seems to impose some restrictions on the communication privacy or anonymity for the symmetric key protocol. This, however, is not true, as session matching for key exchange does not refer to the actual usage of the derived keys in the subsequent protocol. In particular, the symmetric key protocol and its security game may well cover anonymity-related properties such as the key-hiding property [14, 1] , i.e. which of two keys has been used to encrypt messages.
Single session game. Usually, game based notions of protocol security require one to consider multiple sessions executed concurrently in order to draw conclusions about the security of the scheme. Notice that when different sessions of the protocol depend only on independent, efficiently samplable states, then it may be possible to reduce the security of the many session scenario to that of a single session. This greatly simplifies the analysis of the protocol and thus allows one to conclude security of the composed protocol more easily.
In symmetric key protocol games, all unknown keys are independent. Thus, in many cases one is able to analyse only the security of a single pair of sessions and, provided this is secure, may conclude the standard multi-session scenario is secure. For example, consider an authenticated channel. An adversary is required to cause any one session to accept some invalid (non-authenticated) message. It is clear, any adversary who is able to do this when there are multiple, concurrently executing sessions, will be able to achieve the same goal when there is only a single run of the protocol being executed. We note that for key exchange protocols, individual runs are not independent due to the session keys depending upon the shared long term asymmetric keys in some way.
The single session game is a symmetric key game where the adversary is allowed to query at most one InitS query and one InitP query, i.e. the adversary is given access to at most one pair of "honest" sessions. The Valid predicate is modified to restrict the number of InitS and InitP queries. We denote this game by Gπ−1. Note that any (multi-session) symmetric key game Gπ has a single session version Gπ−1. A symmetric key game is called single session reducible if its (multi-session) security can be reduced to the security of the corresponding single session game.
Definition 5 (Single-Session Reducibility). A security game Gπ is single session reducible if for any PPT adversary A against Gπ where Adv Gπ π,A (1 η ) is non-negligible, then there exists a PPT adversary B against Gπ−1 such that Adv
We stress again that single-session reducibility is not a prerequisite for our general composition theorem to work. This class of protocols only supports a simpler analysis.
In the full version we treat necessary conditions for single session reducibility. We show that the game of authenticated channels satisfies this condition. Hence, a single session secure authenticated channel remains secure when putting the protocol into a multi-session setting where the symmetric key generation of the protocol is replaced by a BR-secure key exchange protocol.
DEFINING COMPOSITION
In this section we discuss the composition of key exchange protocols with symmetric key protocols. The composition of a key exchange protocol and symmetric key protocol is as ξke;π (((pki, ski) , pkj, sid, κke, γ, sinfoke, κπ, sinfoπ), msg):
If γ = accepted then //Hand message to key exchange Run (((pki, ski), pkj, sid , κ ke , γ , sinfo ke ), response) ← ξke(((pki, ski), pkj, sid, κke, γ, sinfoke), msg) If γ = accepted then set κπ := κke (κ π , sinfo π ) ← (κπ, sinfoπ) If γ = accepted then //Pass message to symmetric protocol Run ((κ π , sinfo π ), response) ← ξπ((κπ, sinfoπ), msg) (sid , κ ke , γ , sinfo ke ) ← (sid, κke, γ, sinfoke) Return (((pki, ski) , pkj, sid , κ ke , γ , sst ke , κ π , sst π ), response) Figure 9 : Algorithm for composed protocol, using ξke and ξπ.
expected: Intuitively, once a session of the key exchange is successfully finished, the derived key is used to initialise and run a session of the symmetric key protocol. Secondly, we define security for the resulting composition.
Syntax of composed protocols
Given the key exchange protocol ke = (kg ke , ξ ke ) and the symmetric key protocol π = (kg π , ξπ) we write the composed protocol as ke; π = (kg ke;π , ξ ke;π ). The key generation algorithm of the composed protocol generates the (long-term) keys for the key exchange protocol, so we set kg ke;π = kg ke . We now detail the construction of the composed protocol's algorithm, namely ξ ke;π .
Composed algorithm. Recall, a session of the key exchange protocol (resp. symmetric key protocol) executes by running the algorithm ξ ke (resp. ξπ). We describe a composed algorithm ξ ke;π , which, for each session, first runs using ξ ke , and upon a session key being accepted, then runs using ξπ. To decide which sub-algorithm to call, the composed algorithm ξ ke;π examines the value γ. If the key exchange session has not yet accepted (γ = accepted) it calls ξ ke , otherwise it calls ξπ. In either case, ξ ke;π passes only the required variables, and updates the variables of the composed game in a consistent way. Formally, the composed algorithm ξ ke;π is defined in Figure 9 .
Syntax of composed games
The composed game, denoted G ke;π , allows the adversary to simultaneously interact with multiple sessions of the composed protocol; some of these sessions may be executing the key exchange, while others are executing the symmetric key protocol. Note that the adversary's goal within the composed game is to "break" the security of the symmetric key protocol and not the key exchange protocol. We write Adv G ke;π ke;π,A (1 η ) for its advantage. We construct the composed game G ke;π using the internal state and queries of the games for key exchange and symmetric key protocols. Given the partnering game G sid for the key exchange game and Gπ for the symmetric key protocol we use an index notation to distinguish between the states of the different games, e.g. SST ke (resp. SSTπ) for the session state of the key exchange partnering game (resp. symmetric key protocol game).
Game state. The composed game contains all the internal state of the key exchange and symmetric protocol games. The session state function for the composed game SST ke;π is defined as the pair of key exchange session state, SST ke , and symmetric key protocol state, SSTπ. Thus, SST ke;π := (SST ke , SSTπ), i.e. for all lsid ∈ LSID, SST ke;π (lsid):= (SST ke (lsid), SSTπ(lsid)). Similarly, the composed local session state is defined by the pair LST ke;π := (LST ke , LSTπ). The execution state for the composed game, EST ke;π , equals the execution state of the key exchange game, EST ke , since the execution state of the symmetric key protocol game is always undefined. The model state in the composed game is the model state of the symmetric key protocol game, i.e. MST ke;π := MSTπ, since the model state for the partnering key exchange game is undefined. When clear from context, we write SST instead of SST ke;π and LST instead of LST ke;π .
The session state SST(lsid) of a session lsid then is a tuple ((pki, ski), pkj, sid, κ ke , γ, sinfo ke , κπ, sinfoπ), and the local session state LST(lsid) of a session lsid is a tuple (δ, δpnr, ω, ψ, lstπ). We omit additional brackets one could use to separate LST ke (lsid) from LSTπ(lsid).
Setup. To set the composed game's initial state we use the key exchange setup algorithms to initialise the key exchange portions of the composed game's state (e.g. SST ke ), and similarly use the symmetric key protocol's setup algorithm for the remainder, see Figure 10 .
Queries. The adversary has similar abilities as previously described. It can send messages to sessions, corrupt longterm keys as well as interact with the symmetric key protocol in any way described by the game Gπ (excluding the InitS, InitP and InitK queries). Notice that we do not allow the adversary access to the Reveal query from the key exchange game in the composed game. The Reveal query was used in the BR-secrecy game to ensure if a session key was compromised, it did not compromise the BR-security of other keys, and to model potential key leakage through the deployment in a potential subsequent protocol (which is now actual in our case). However, we are now considering the security of the symmetric key protocol (in the composed setting), thus the Reveal query is no longer allowed, unless the symmetric key protocol itself provides an equivalent query.
We modify the Send query slightly to set the value of ψ to known if a key exchange session accepts when its partner is corrupted. The rest of the behaviour of the Send query remains unchanged. We denote the behaviour of the partnering key exchange game by χ ke and the behaviour of the symmetric protocol game by χπ. The behaviour of the composed game is given in Figure 11 .
Remember that SST ke;π := (SST ke , SST π ) and LST ke;π := (LST ke , LST π ). Informally, the behaviour χ ke;π processes key exchange queries by calling the behaviour χ ke , and symmetric key protocol queries by calling χπ. The Send query constitutes an exception, as it is used by both the ke and π stage of the composition. Here, the behaviour χ ke;π uses the composed algorithm ξ ke;π to process the Send query, noting the above modification, where the value ψ is set appropriately when a session accepts a key at the key exchange stage.
The Valid predicate for the InitS, InitP, InitK and Reveal queries always return false to make these queries invalid.
χke;π(q, (LSID, (SSTke, SSTπ), (LSTke, LSTπ), ESTke, MSTπ)):
If q is a Send query then //Call ξke;π, if the session accepts //a key then mark this key as 'known' if appropriate
Parse q into Send(lsid, msg). Set SST ke;π ← SSTke;π, LST ke;π ← LSTke;π. Run (SST ke;π (lsid), response) ← ξke;π(SSTke;π(lsid), msg) If SSTke;π(lsid).γ = SST ke;π (lsid).γ, SST ke;π (lsid).γ = accepted and there exists lsid * ∈ LSID \ {lsid} such that SSTke;π(lsid * ).sid = SST ke;π (lsid).sid then set LST ke;π (lsid).ψ ← LSTke;π(lsid * ).ψ Else if SSTke;π(lsid).γ = SST ke;π (lsid).γ and SST ke;π (lsid).γ = accepted then:
If LSTke;π(lsid).δpnr = corrupt then set LST ke;π (lsid).ψ ← known Return ((SST ke;π , LST ke;π , ESTke, MSTπ), response) If q is a Corrupt query then //Corrupt as for key exchange Run ((SST ke , LST ke , EST ke , ⊥), response) ← χke(q, (LSID, SSTke, LSTke, ESTke, ⊥)) Set SST π ← SSTπ, LST π ← LSTπ, MST π ← MSTπ Return ((SST ke;π , LST ke;π , EST ke , MST π ), response) If q is a query from Q that is neither a Send nor a Corrupt query then: //Execute as for symmetric protocols Run ((SST π , LST π , ⊥, MST π ), response) ← χπ(q, (LSID, SSTπ, LSTπ, ⊥, MSTπ)) SST ke ← SSTke, LST ke ← LSTke, EST ke ← ESTke Return ((SST ke;π , LST ke;π , EST ke , MST π ), response) Figure 11 : Behaviour χke;π of composed games. Predicate. We consider that an adversary breaks the security of the composition if it breaks the security of the symmetric key protocol (as captured by the predicate Pπ). Therefore P ke;π is defined as Pπ(LSID, SSTπ, LSTπ, ⊥, MSTπ), i.e. we evaluate the predicate Pπ on the state of the symmetric key protocol, π, maintained by the composed game.
COMPOSITION RESULT
We now present our main results. In Theorem 1 we show that a BR-secure key exchange, with the additional property of having an efficient session matching algorithm, securely composes with a symmetric key protocol. Theorem 1. Let ke be a BR-secure key exchange protocol w.r.t. D, where an efficient session matching algorithm exists. Let π be a secure protocol w.r.t. Gπ. If the key generation algorithm of π outputs keys with distribution D then the composition ke; π is secure w.r.t. G ke;π and for any efficient A we have for some efficient algorithms B and C, where ni is the maximum number of participants and ns is the maximum number of sessions, and thus ni 2 · ns is the size of the set LSID.
The proof proceeds in two stages. First, we show that we can replace all the session keys one-by-one with random keys, where partner sessions are keyed with the same random value. This results in a composed game, where keys used by the symmetric protocol are independent of the key exchange. Next, we show this is then equivalent to the symmetric key protocol game Gπ. Intuitively this means a break against this composition is a break against the symmetric key protocol, where keys are generated randomly. A complete proof of Theorem 1 can be found in the full version of the paper.
The following corollary is an immediate application of Theorem 1, for single session reducible protocols. Essentially, if a symmetric key protocol is single session reducible, then it securely composes with a BR-secure key exchange protocol.
Corollary 1. Let ke be a BR-secure key exchange protocol w.r.t. D, where an efficient session matching algorithm exists. Let Gπ be a single session reducible security game, and let π be a secure protocol w.r.t. Gπ−1. If the key generation algorithm of π outputs keys with distribution D then the composition ke; π is secure w.r.t. G ke;π .
Proof. Since π is secure w.r.t Gπ−1, and Gπ is single session reducible we have that π is secure w.r.t. Gπ by definition. Therefore we can now apply Theorem 1 and the result holds.
CONCLUSION
We have developed a formal abstract framework for specifying cryptographic games, to enable the modelling of twoparty protocols. We specialise our abstract framework to allow the analysis of key exchange protocols, following the original security notions of Bellare and Rogaway. Further, we identify a general class of protocols, called symmetric key protocols, which use the session key exchanged by a key exchange protocol. We show that a key exchange protocol, which is secure in the Bellare-Rogaway sense, i.e. keys are indistinguishable from random, composed with a symmetric key protocol that is secure when session keys are generated randomly, results in a secure composition. Interestingly, for such a composition, it is required that there exists a session matching algorithm, which is able to identify partner sessions of the key exchange protocol. Conversely, we also show, for any BR-secure key exchange protocol (a weak form of) such a session matching algorithm must exist. Yet, exploring the full relationship is an interesting open problem.
Our composition results apply to BR-secure protocols such as EAC [10] . It would be interesting to extend our work to allow for key confirmation in key exchange protocols. If the parties apply such a confirmation step during the key exchange phase to check if they have agreed upon the same key, without performing a key refresh afterward, then the key exchange protocol cannot be secure in the model of Bellare and Rogaway. This, however, is a common technique in protocols like TLS. It may sometimes be possible to decouple the confirmation step from the key-exchange part (and essentially consider it as part of the symmetric-key protocol). In this situation our composition result should still apply. An interesting open problem is to allow for such a modular analysis in a generic way.
